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Using scenario-based iŶflueŶĐe ŵappiŶg to eǆaŵiŶe farŵers’ ďioseĐuritǇ ďehaviour 
 
Abstract 
 
UŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of faƌŵeƌs͛ iŶflueŶĐes ƌelatiŶg to ďioseĐuƌitǇ is suƌpƌisiŶglǇ ǁeak, 
beyond general remarks that farmers tend to trust their private vet. Previous studies 
have explored influences in relation to single issue events. There is a need for better 
ŵethodologies to fullǇ appƌeĐiate hoǁ faƌŵeƌs͛ ďioseĐuƌitǇ pƌaĐtiĐes aƌe shaped. 
Using bovine Tuberculosis as a case study, this paper uses stakeholder mapping 
methods applied across diffeƌeŶt sĐeŶaƌios. The aiŵ is to ideŶtifǇ hoǁ faƌŵeƌs͛ 
responses to animal disease policy are shaped by their relationships with different 
actors. Interviews were conducted with 50 farmers in three areas in England. Farmers 
were presented with four scenarios to control bovine TB: 1) a badger cull, 2) an oral 
badger vaccine, 3) a cattle vaccine and 4) a range of control measures. The results 
show that as things get more uncertain, government institutions become more 
influential. Government institutions and government vets are also important in 
situations where farmers do not consider themselves ͚eǆpeƌts͛ i.e. ǀaĐcination as 
opposed to culling. The influence of other farmers was not universal; it differed 
between scenarios. These data show the value of scenario-based stakeholder 
mapping as a methodology that can enable biosecurity researchers to: more 
accurately and systematically determine stakeholder influence and understand how 
these influences change and evolve; understand the role of farmer biosecurity 
practices, the self-concept and ͚good faƌŵiŶg͛; aŶd ideŶtifǇ ďƌoadeƌ logiĐs of 
biosecurity that influence and potentially frustrate animal disease policy goals. 
 
Keywords: Farmer behaviour, social norms and influence; Good farming; Stakeholder 
analysis; Scenario-based influence mapping; Bovine Tuberculosis; England.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
It is increasingly accepted that understanding animal disease transmission requires 
not just epidemiological science, but social science approaches that allow the 
attitudes and practices of people to be taken into account. There is a now well-
established social science biosecurity literature (for reviews see Bingham et al. 2008, 
Dobson et al. 2013, Reed and Curzon 2015, Hinchliffe et al. 2016) that includes analysis 
of international, national and sub-national biosecurity governance frameworks (e.g. 
Barker 2010, Maye et al. 2012, Higgins et al. 2016) and local analysis of biosecurity 
techniques among stakeholder groups/populations, including ͚ĐoŶfiguƌatioŶs of 
pƌaĐtiĐes͛ on farms (e.g. Enticott 2008, Hinchliffe and Ward 2014, Naylor et al. 2017). 
Local and global disease events such as Foot and Mouth, bovine Tuberculosis (bTB) 
and Avian Influenza have promoted a concern and emphasis within biosecurity studies 
to understand the behaviour of farmers, vets and other stakeholders. In other policy 
areas, studies of farmer behaviour have typically relied upon behavioural frameworks 
such as the Theory of Reasoned Action (TORA) and the Theory of Planned Behaviour 
(TPB). These approaches have been widely used in agricultural and environmental 
contexts, suggestiŶg that faƌŵeƌs͛ behaviour is shaped by subjective norms – the 
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influence of others upon social norms of behaviour, usually pointing to farmers͛ 
ƌeliaŶĐe oŶ ͞dialogue with other farmers for ideas and information, as well as 
professional advisers, agricultuƌal Ŷeǁspapeƌs aŶd ŵagaziŶes͟ (Garforth 2015, p.31). 
 
Biosecurity studies have sought to identify the levels of interest and influence 
amongst different stakeholders as a means of optimising disease prevention 
communication. These studies have drawn on farmer behaviour studies and 
consequently theoretical approaches applied to examine stakeholder influence and 
its relationship with farmer biosecurity practices have tended to be dominated by 
behavioural and psychological frameworks (TORA/TPB) (Gunn et al. 2008). Whilst the 
theoretical frameworks used in these psychological studies can offer a way of 
understanding biosecurity behaviour, Burton (2004a) and Fielding et al (2008) have 
suggested that caution is required in interpreting their results. They point to failures 
of inadequately specifying and measuring the full range of stakeholders and their 
relative importance in different contexts. In short, for different diseases, a different 
range of actors may be more or less influential than others. Without identifying the 
most appropriate stakeholders for each policy field, generic measures will dilute the 
influence of the most appropriate. Methods are required that can both identify and 
assess the level of influence of each actor. As Reed and Curzon (2015, p.15) note, 
͞…attempts to systematically identify, categorise or analyse stakeholders in this field 
aƌe ƌelatiǀelǇ ƌaƌe͟. 
 
This paper argues that scenario-based influence mapping is a useful methodological 
approach that provides a systematic approach for researchers to identify and tease 
out the different social iŶflueŶĐes oŶ faƌŵeƌs͛ ďioseĐuƌitǇ pƌaĐtiĐes aŶd ďehaǀiouƌs iŶ 
specific governance contexts. Scenario-based influence mapping contributes to and 
builds on recent social science approaches that have been developed to address the 
limitations of behavioural frameworks and psychological approaches. This work gives 
greater emphasis to social, cultural and institutional influences, using theories of 
social capital (Fisher 2013), trust and risk (Enticott et al. 2014), lay and situated 
knowledges (Hinchliffe and Ward 2014, Maye et al. 2014) and institutional logics 
(Higgins et al. 2016). The aim here is to extend this work by identifying hoǁ faƌŵeƌs͛ 
responses to animal disease policy are shaped by their relationships with different 
actors. Other studies have explored these influences in relation to single issue events 
(e.g. studies of specific disease events, such as Foot and Mouth outbreaks). In this 
paper we use stakeholder mapping methods developed by Oreszczyn et al. (2010) 
across a range of different scenarios. The scenarios all relate to potential solutions to 
address bovine Tuberculosis (bTB) in England and reflect not just different technical 
solutions, but also different solutions to the governance of animal disease. This 
contributes to an understanding of how farmers are encountering and reacting to the 
changing governance of animal disease in the United Kingdom (Enticott et al. 2011, 
Maye et al. 2014). It also helps to account for social and cultural influences related to 
the self-ĐoŶĐept aŶd ͚ good faƌŵiŶg͛ ;BuƌtoŶ ϮϬϬϰa/ď, NaǇloƌ et al. 2017) and connects 
the biosecurity literature more explicitly with theories of soĐial leaƌŶiŶg aŶd ͚ǁeďs of 
iŶflueŶĐe͛ ;OƌeszĐzǇŶ et al. 2010). 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, the importance of appropriate 
stakeholder mapping exercises in agricultural and disease control research is 
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reviewed. Second, the case context of the study – bTB and its changing governance – 
is introduced. Third, methods and scenarios are explained, including the design of 
influence maps, before presenting results. Finally, we discuss the benefits of the 
stakeholder mapping approach developed in the paper as a means to understand 
webs of influence (Oreszczyn et al. (2010). This includes reflections on how 
conversations with farmers related to the influence maps could be used to deepen 
analysis of biosecurity logics that can help explain resistance to biosecurity policies 
(Higgins et al. 2016). 
 
2. Biosecurity stakeholders, webs of influence and significant others 
There has been increasing interest in animal disease in the social sciences (Fish et al. 
2011, Dobson et al. 2013, Hinchliffe et al. 2016). Partly, this has been driven by the 
global and spectacular nature of diseases such as Foot and Mouth and Avian Influenza. 
The spread of animal disease, though, can also be seen as a symptom of climate 
change, contributing to the challenge of food security (Godfray et al. 2010, Maye and 
Kirwan 2013) captured within the ͚oŶe-health͛ ageŶda (AVMA 2008). Whilst these 
concerns have prompted technological efforts to reduce the impact of animal disease 
(such as the development of new vaccines), they have also been accompanied by 
atteŵpts to ĐhaŶge faƌŵeƌs͛ ďehaǀiouƌ aŶd deǀelop foƌms of social resilience in 
agricultural communities. In doing so, Governments have sought to identify and 
analyse the key drivers for animal disease behaviour amongst farmers, vets and other 
agricultural professionals, in order to identify the best possible means to 
communicate with and influence their behaviour. 
 
This kind of research is not unfamiliar to land-use and agricultural scholars. Numerous 
studies eǆist, foƌ eǆaŵple, that seek to uŶdeƌstaŶd faƌŵeƌs͛ ďehaǀiouƌ iŶ ƌelatioŶ to 
their participation in environmental schemes (Morris and Potter 1995), the delivery 
of ecosystems services (Wynne-Jones 2013), conservation practices (Beedell and 
Rehman 2000, Pannell et al. 2006), faƌŵeƌs͛ ƌespoŶses to Đliŵate ĐhaŶge (Fleming and 
Vanclay 2010, Hyland et al. 2016), soil management (Ingram 2008), and the adoption 
of new agricultural technologies (Garforth et al. 2006, Higgins 2007). Many of these 
studies rest on the assumption that identifying how farmers behave, and the influence 
of their social networks, can help ensure that new policies and practices can be more 
effectively communicated to them, thereby ensuring greater policy efficiency. Such a 
belief is also attractive to policy makers in the field of animal disease, such that recent 
studies of faƌŵeƌs͛ aŶiŵal health pƌaĐtiĐes aƌe justified oŶ these grounds. For 
example, Garforth (2015, p.30) argues that this kind of research ͞ can help in the design 
of appropriate, targeted communication, and of effective policies and regulatory 
frameworks͟. In relation to biosecurity, Alarcon et al. (2014, p.224) argue that 
͞effective communication of relevant disease-related knowledge is essential to 
faĐilitate faƌŵeƌs͛ deĐisioŶs oŶ disease ĐoŶtƌol aŶd, theƌeďǇ to help theŵ ŵiŶiŵize 
the impact of diseases͟. Similarly, Hernández-Jover et al. (2012, p.262) suggest that 
͞uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg stakeholdeƌs͛ iŶteƌest aŶd iŶflueŶĐe oŶ the issue can assist in the 
development of risk management and communication strategies identifying those 
most likely to be in a position to influence the actions of the target group͟. 
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Where studies are based on a risk communication rationale, they have frequently 
relied on psychological models of human behaviour such as TORA or TPB (Ajzen 1991, 
Fishbein and Ajzen 2010). These models provide an explanation of how attitudes link 
to behavioural intentions through the incorporation of subjective norms – the extent 
to which an individual believes significant others believe that they should engage in a 
behaviour. Perceived behavioural control is also included in the TPB to account for the 
extent to which people believe they can do something about the challenges (such as 
disease outbreaks) they face. 
 
Although these approaches have been widely used in agricultural studies (Carr and 
Tait 1990), Burton (2004a) argues that many are flawed through incorrect application. 
Firstly, he suggests that many studies fail to take into account the influence of 
significant others on decision making by conflating subjective norms with attitudes, 
such that resulting explanations are divorced from the social context iŶ ǁhiĐh faƌŵeƌs͛ 
make decisions. For example, Benjamin et al. (2010) eǆaŵiŶe faƌŵeƌs͛ attitudes to 
cattle disease but make no mention of subjective norms. Alternatively, studies often 
ŵeasuƌe the iŶflueŶĐe of people ǁithiŶ faƌŵeƌs͛ ͚iŶfoƌŵatioŶ eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶts͛ to 
account for subjective norms. However, Terry et al. (1999) argue that these can only 
be considered subjective norms when they are behaviour specific and follow the 
͚pƌiŶĐiple of ĐoŵpatiďilitǇ͛ – i.e. they are specific to the situation being researched. As 
noted by Fielding et al. (2008) and Terry and Hogg (1996), aggregating impressions of 
people who are more or less important runs the risk of diluting the significance of 
those people who are relevant to that behaviour. Burton (2004a) also points to the 
importance of differentiating between social norms and subjective norms, or the 
difference between those behaviours approved of by others, and the perceived 
evaluations of those behaviours. 
 
OŶe ƌeasoŶ foƌ the failuƌe to pƌoduĐe data ͞Đapaďle of pƌoduĐiŶg a ďƌoad eŶough 
piĐtuƌe of faƌŵeƌ ŵotiǀatioŶ͟ (Burton 2004a, p.365) is the time and funding such 
research demands. As Gilmour et al. (2011) show, accounting for all the potential 
sources of subjective norm can be a lengthy process, when done properly, leading to 
a lengthy questionnaire (Burton 2004a). As a result, biosecurity researchers may 
siŵplǇ ƌeduĐe the ǀaƌious souƌĐes of iŶflueŶĐe to a ͚Đoƌe-set͛ to ŵake ƌeseaƌĐh ŵoƌe 
practical (see for example, Toma et al. 2013). Alternatively, the TPB may simply be 
used as a qualitative interview guide rather than as a tool for quantitative assessment. 
For example, Alarcon et al. (2014) use the TPB framework to investigate pig producers 
biosecurity practices, identifying vets and other farmers as the key sources of 
influence upon their disease management practices (see also Gunn et al. 2008, Ellis-
Iversen et al. 2010). Similarly, Garforth et al. (2013) eǆaŵiŶe pig aŶd sheep faƌŵeƌs͛ 
practices using a qualitative application of the TPB, finding that neighbouring farmers 
͚haƌdlǇ figuƌe͛ as a souƌĐe of influence. 
 
For Burton (2004a), these findings appear unlikely, and provide a further criticism of 
atteŵpts to ŵodel faƌŵeƌs͛ ďehaǀiouƌ usiŶg TO‘A/TPB. That faƌŵeƌs͛ ďehaǀiouƌ is Ŷot 
influenced by other farmers contradicts research that shows farming to be 
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ĐoŶseƌǀatiǀe iŶ Ŷatuƌe aŶd ͚heaǀilǇ iŵďued ǁith status sǇŵďols͛ used to Đƌeate 
ŶotioŶs of ͚good faƌŵiŶg͛ aŶd the ͚good faƌŵeƌ͛ that ĐaŶ plaǇ iŵpoƌtaŶt ƌoles in 
guiding and shaping farmer behaviour (Burgess et al. 2000, Oreszczyn and Lane 2000, 
Egoz et al. 2001, Burton 2004b). Apart from subjective norms, other social and cultural 
iŶflueŶĐes suĐh as the ͚self-ĐoŶĐept͛ oƌ self-identity factors (Stryker 1994) are also 
likely to influence behaviour. Incorporating quantitative measures of self-identify into 
the TPB, Fielding et al.͛s (2008) study of riparian zone management practices also 
shows that these factors are sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ ƌelated to faƌŵeƌs͛ ďehaǀiouƌal intention. In 
the context of biosecurity, qualitative research by Naylor et al. (2017) shows how 
different ideas of farming self-identity influence decisions farmers take over exotic 
disease, such as reporting and prevention. 
 
The outcome from this is that ƌeseaƌĐh iŶto faƌŵeƌs͛ ďioseĐuƌitǇ ďehaǀiouƌs Ŷeeds to 
take more seriously subjective norms – whether part of a framework like TPB or not – 
to fully understand biosecurity behaviour, and if so required, design effective 
communication strategies. To date that does not appear to have happened: subjective 
norms are either ignored, conflated with attitudes, reduced to broad groups, and/or 
do not follow the principle of compatibility. Moreover, whilst interviews and focus 
groups are recommended as a way of developing a list of normative influences (Ajzen 
2002), it is frequently unclear how researchers have conducted this task. Despite calls 
for participatory approaches to epidemiology and biosecurity (see Catley et al. 2012), 
new methodological tools for identifying relevant stakeholders have not been 
developed. Instead, studies have tended to rely on traditional methods of interviews, 
focus groups and researcher verification (Hernández-Jover et al. 2012). 
 
One way of addressing these gaps is by using one of the various established methods 
of stakeholder analysis. Reed and Curzon (2015) identify a range of different 
stakeholder identification methods. Stakeholder identification can occur ex-ante, 
through consultation of official documents, or ad hoc in which the list of stakeholders 
is developed through an iterative consultative process. One exception is research by 
Gilmour et al. (2011) who describe how a biosecurity stakeholder map was developed 
through separate rounds of consultation, although it is unclear how stakeholders were 
selected. Stakeholder mapping can also be used to identify the different people that 
farmers consult, and gauge their level of influence, often according to pre-existing 
categories based on their level of interest and influence (Mills et al. 2011). Whilst 
these methods are useful for policy analysis, Oreszczyn et al. (2010) draw on methods 
of ĐogŶitiǀe ŵappiŶg to aŶalǇse faƌŵeƌs͛ Ŷetǁoƌks of iŶflueŶĐe iŶ the ĐoŶteǆt of 
genetically modified crops. Their approach relied on a method of interactive and 
discursive mapping in interviews. Farmers were asked to write down potential 
influencers on post-it notes and place them on concentric circles representing their 
perceived level of influence. The process was iterative, in that the initial map could be 
changed following discussion between the researcher and participant about the 
location in which they had placed each influencer and why they had placed them 
there. 
 
Interestingly, the results presented by Oreszczyn et al. (2010) are ambiguous when it 
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comes to assessing the influence of other farmers, questioning the significance of the 
self-concept. On the one hand, Oreszczyn et al. (2010) find that farmers lack a ͚stƌoŶg 
foƌŵal oƌgaŶisatioŶal fƌaŵeǁoƌk͛ and opeƌate as a ͚distƌiďuted Ŷetǁoƌk of pƌaĐtiĐe͛ 
in which ideas and advice are sought and given from a wide range of actors. In dealing 
with this complex social learning system, farmers relied on experiential learning, and 
interacted with fellow farmers in their ͚network of practice͛. Hoǁeǀeƌ, they did not 
feel that they learned directly from these interactions, such as with farming 
neighbours or taking part in faƌŵeƌs͛ disĐussioŶ gƌoups. Instead, a ǁideƌ ͚ǁeď of 
iŶflueŶĐeƌs͛ – people and organisations who are not farmers – emerged that directly 
influenced faƌŵeƌs͛ pƌaĐtiĐes and decision-making. Whilst these were relatively 
stable, they could change over time, particularly following changes to the politics of 
agricultural governance such as the reduction in government agencies providing 
extension services to farmers in the UK e.g. ADAS. 
 
These studies question the significance of other farmers as influencers and the 
influence of self-identity. This is a surprising finding but it could also be that questions 
lack focus – i.e. they fail the principle of compatibility. This is an ever-present problem 
in biosecurity research in which the broad meaning of biosecurity or disease 
underplays the contested meanings of biosecurity and how farmers can respond to 
different disease threats in different ways (Naylor et al. 2017). Alternatively, Burton 
(2004a) suggests that faƌŵeƌs͛ stƌoŶg seŶse of ͚iŶdepeŶdeŶĐe͛ ŵaǇ ŵeaŶ theǇ aƌe 
unwilling to admit that they are under the strong social influence of their peers. 
Factors relating to self-identity may also be expressed in other ways. As Fielding et al. 
(2008) point out, identity factors may be expressed in relation to the extent to which 
situations are judged to be betweeŶ oŶe of ͚us͛ aŶd ͚theŵ͛, aŶd the eǆteŶt to ǁhiĐh 
an out-gƌoup͛s poǁeƌ aŶd status is judged to ďe legitiŵate. Wheƌe this is the Đase, 
strategies of non-compliance will follow. 
 
Expressions of self-identity can be found in resistance towards biosecurity and other 
areas of agricultural and land use policy. Fielding et al. (2008), for example, measured 
aspects of intergroup identity based on distinctions between rural and urban society 
and the legitimacy of rule makers, finding a relationship between identity and 
behaviour. Biosecurity research frequently finds that resistance to animal disease 
policy and new biosecurity rules are based in perceived beliefs of illegitimate power. 
Frequently, these are based on the legitimacy of different kinds of ͚expertise͛ (Maye 
et al. 2014) aŶd ͚tƌust͛ (Enticott et al. 2014) conceptualised through a rural versus 
urban distinction (Enticott 2008). Similarly, HiggiŶs et al.͛s (2016) analysis of 
biosecurity governance in Australia, involving government and industry stakeholders, 
identifies three institutional logics (neoliberal, productivist and agrarian) that provide 
roles and codes of conduct. The agaƌiaŶ logiĐ dƌaǁs oŶ AitkeŶ͛s (1985) idea of 
͚ĐouŶtƌǇŵiŶdedŶess͛ through which Higgins et al. (2016, p. 1144) show how resistance 
to biosecurity rules reflect a ͞contrast between the artificiality of city life, where 
political power resides, and the authentic as well as ennobling virtues of farming and 
rural living͟. Importantly, Higgins et al. suggest that new forms of biosecurity 
governance are likely to deepen the differences between this logic of biosecurity, and 
the neoliberal logic which sees producers as owners and implementers of biosecurity 
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policy. Indeed, the tensions between these different logics are likely to be exacerbated 
by the development of new forms of animal disease governance that seek to 
redistribute costs and responsibilities to farmers, further reflecting the belief that 
goǀeƌŶŵeŶts aƌe ͞disĐoŶŶeĐted fƌoŵ the ͞ƌealities͟ of ƌuƌal life, ŵakiŶg it eǀeŶ ŵoƌe 
difficult for governments to engage producers in taking more responsibility for 
ďioseĐuƌitǇ͟ (Higgins et al. 2016, p. 1147). 
 
This section has identified some major limitations in the biosecurity literature in terms 
of strategies to systematically identify the diffeƌeŶt iŶflueŶĐes oŶ faƌŵeƌs͛ biosecurity 
practices. This critique can be summarised as follows. Firstly, theoretical models of 
farmer behaviour suggest the importance of subjective norms. However, in relation 
to biosecurity, and more specifically the identification of different influences on 
faƌŵeƌs͛ ďioseĐuƌitǇ pƌaĐtiĐes, analysis of extant studies suggests the full range of 
actors is not always considered. There is also a failure to specify the relative 
importance of actors in different contexts. Methodologies are available to more fully 
identify relevant actors and avoid aggregating different social groups. Secondly, there 
is aŵďiguitǇ oǀeƌ the ƌole of otheƌ faƌŵeƌs iŶ iŶflueŶĐiŶg faƌŵeƌs͛ deĐisioŶs. This ŵaǇ 
be related to the principle of compatibility in which vague notions – such as 
͚biosecurity͛ – conflate a range of different actions each with their own specific 
influences. Analysing a range of separate and specific activities can help to resolve 
these problems. Thirdly, analysis of the full range of actors may also reveal different 
expressions of the self-concept, particularly in relation to the governance of 
biosecurity. This is missing in current behavioural and soĐial sĐieŶĐe studies of faƌŵeƌs͛ 
biosecurity practices. As new forms of biosecurity governance develop, it is important 
to uŶdeƌstaŶd hoǁ faƌŵeƌs͛ ideŶtities ŵesh ǁith oƌ jaƌ agaiŶst these Ŷeǁ ǁaǇs of 
controlling disease. Common to all strands of this critique is the need for better 
ŵethodologies to fullǇ appƌeĐiate hoǁ faƌŵeƌs͛ ďiosecurity practices are shaped. The 
following section sets out a methodology that allows these problems to be explored 
more fully. 
 
3. Methodology 
IŶ seekiŶg to eǆploƌe faƌŵeƌs͛ ďioseĐuƌitǇ ďehaǀiouƌ, ǁe pƌopose the use of sĐeŶaƌio-
based influence mapping as a methodology. This approach provides a systematic 
method to identify webs of influence. The social science biosecurity literature 
regularly recognises the significance of wider influences through related discussions 
about ͚trust͛, ͚expertise͛, ͚local knowledge͛, ͚ĐƌediďilitǇ͛, etc. However, a more 
systematic approach is needed. The scenario-based influence mapping methodology 
set out here provides a way to more accurately determine and identify stakeholder 
influences in specific contexts. Taking this approach to identify and categorise 
stakeholders thus addresses a key limitation of psychological studies, which often lack 
context sensitivity and conflate subjective norms with attitudes. It also enables social 
science researchers to relate understandings of farmer biosecurity practice to notions 
of ͚good faƌŵiŶg͛ (Naylor et al. 2017). We begin this section by defining how scenarios 
can be used, before analysing forms of stakeholder and influence mapping. Finally, we 
outline how we put these methods to use iŶ aŶalǇsiŶg faƌŵeƌs͛ ďioseĐuƌitǇ ďehaǀiouƌ. 
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3.1 Scenarios 
 
Scenarios are plausible descriptions of alternative futures that can be used to 
stimulate thinking or challenge preconceptions (Quine et al. 2011). They provide 
opportunities to elicit attitudes and beliefs about complex and potentially sensitive 
situations (Soleri and Cleveland 2005, Hulme and Dessai 2008) and to examine the 
causes and consequences of what may happen in future (van der Heijden 1996). The 
approach is applied in future studies and other fields, including psychology and health 
care (see, for example, Miller-Perrin et al. 1990, Hughes and Huby 2002). 
 
In relation to agriculture or disease control, applications of scenario methodologies 
are limited. “oleƌi aŶd CleǀelaŶd ;ϮϬϬϱͿ used sĐeŶaƌios to uŶdeƌstaŶd faƌŵeƌs͛ 
biological knowledge in relation to crop growth. Research by Quine et al. (2011) 
developed scenarios to explore organisational responses to zoonotic threats with land 
managers, finding that individuals are unlikely to simply respond to information but 
iŶstead aƌe iŶflueŶĐed ďǇ a ǁide ƌaŶge of souƌĐes ;Ŷot ƌestƌiĐted to ͚offiĐial͛ sources) 
and signals e.g. not just information, but also the actions of others (Quine, et al. 2011). 
Oreszczyn et al. (2010) also use scenarios to explore the potential impacts and 
outcomes of GM technology amongst farmers. They argue that scenarios are best 
developed in consultation with those directly affected by them. 
 
Scenario exercises often develop and then refine scenarios following extensive 
reflection and cognitive mapping (see van der Heijden 1996). In this paper, scenarios 
were used in a targeted way: as a tool to construct stakeholder influence maps with 
farmers in relation to specific technical bTB control options for cattle/wildlife. To do 
this, four scenarios were developed in close consultation with Government policy 
officials responsible for bTB (summarised in Table 1). The scenarios reflected the 
contents of their proposed eradication strategy (Defra 2014a), formed the basis of a 
public consultation exercise and were explored in more depth as part of a citizen 
dialogue exercise (Defra 2014b). The sscenarios reflected the use of different disease 
control methods (wildlife culling and vaccination, and cattle vaccination) and the role 
for different methods of governance (government versus farmer-led control 
schemes). Farmers were not directly involved in the process of developing scenarios. 
However, as part of a longitudinal study, the farmers involved had met the researchers 
on three prior occasions to discuss a range of issues related to the control of bTB on 
their farms, the governance of the disease, and methods of prevention. In that sense, 
the conversations provoked by the scenarios were familiar to them and did not 
present any significant challenges to them. Moreover, the scenarios all reflected 
possiďle Ŷeaƌ futuƌes. This ƌefleĐts Beƌkhout aŶd HeƌtiŶ͛s (2002) advice to avoid 
scenarios set too far ahead as they are difficult to engage with and can seem 
meaningless to many people. 
 
--- Insert Table 1 about here --- 
 
 
3.2 Scenarios and influence mapping 
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For all four scenarios the aim was to collect farmer responses and views but to also 
use them to better understand who/what influences farmer decisions. The exercise 
was therefore not simply about identifying relevant stakeholders, but searching for 
eǆplaŶatioŶs aŶd ƌatioŶales foƌ faƌŵeƌs͛ ĐhoiĐes. This ƌefleĐts experiences from 
previous applications of scenario methods: Oreszczyn and Carr (2008), for example, 
found that discussions about the scenarios were as important as the points that were 
documented on a given scenario. Scenario discussions typically examine causes and 
consequences of what might happen in the future. Here farmer responses were more 
prescriptive, designed to examine faƌŵeƌs͛ likelǇ iŶflueŶĐes. To do this, we relied on 
the same interactive mapping exercise used by Oreszczyn et al. (2010). In their case, 
seventeen farmers undertook a group-based interactive mapping exercise, whereby 
theǇ ǁeƌe asked to plaĐe ͚iŶflueŶĐeƌs͛ ;i.e. keǇ people that iŶflueŶĐe theiƌ faƌŵ 
business decision making) on a circular grid. Post-it notes were used to locate 
influencers on the map, with those having the most influence being placed at the 
centre and those with the least influence placed nearer the edge or outside of the 
concentric circles. Farmers were asked how the map would change if they were 
considering new technologies and GM crops, and post-it notes were taken away or 
added accordingly. 
For our study, the interactive mapping exercises took place as part of longitudinal 
interviews with a panel of 50 farmers in three study areas in the west and south-west 
of England. The three study areas were Stroud (Gloucestershire), Congleton (Cheshire) 
and Great Torrington (Devon). The study locations are all areas where bTB is high. The 
50 cattle farmers (31 beef, 19 dairy) had been part of the study for four years. They 
were originally selected for interview from a telephone survey of 341 farmers based 
on their varied levels of confidence in bTB control methods and herd size/type. 
Participant details are shown in Table 2. Further methodological details can be found 
in Maye et al. (2014).  
 
--- Insert Table 2 about here --- 
 
For each scenario, farmers firstly discussed the scenario in general, before being asked 
what actions they would take in that scenario. People and organisations that farmers 
said they would seek advice from were recorded on to post-it notes. Farmers were 
then asked to rate the people they mentioned by placing the post-it notes onto the 
concentric circles of the influence map (see Figure 1). Those with most influence were 
positioned towards the centre of the circle and those with progressively less influence 
were positioned further towards the edge. The range of influencers included 
organisations, such as the farming press or Defra, but also named individuals. For 
eǆaŵple, faƌŵeƌs ǁould fƌeƋueŶtlǇ ƌefeƌ to speĐifiĐ faƌŵeƌs oƌ ͚theiƌ͛ ǀet, ƌatheƌ thaŶ 
farmers or private vets in general. The qualitative comments farmers provided during 
the interviews for each influence map were critical to identify such differences. Thus, 
whilst these influences have been coded as farmers or vets, it is important to 
recognise that they are related to individuals rather than as a collective. 
 
--- Insert Figure 1 about here --- 
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In terms of scoring, the centre circle (my farm) was 0 and the surrounding concentric 
circles were labelled 1-6. In the analysis responses were re-coded 1-7. Where post-it 
notes overlapped interviewees were asked to identify which circle they should be 
placed within. On a few occasions respondents placed a person or organisation 
;ƌefeƌƌed to heŶĐefoƌth as aŶ ͚iŶflueŶĐeƌ͛Ϳ oŶ the outside ďouŶdaƌǇ of the ŵap ;i.e. 
beyond the concentric circles). These responses were coded as 8 in the analysis. For 
each influencer, the interviewee was asked a series of questions relating to their 
positioning and the factors that they consider important. Interviewees were 
questioned about any notable changes/differences between scenarios in terms of 
influencers. Following the discussion, farmers were given the opportunity to change 
the influence map if they so wished before a photograph was taken of the final version 
(see Figure 2 for an example). 
 
--- Insert Figure 2 about here --- 
 
As faƌ as possiďle, the eǆeƌĐise ǁas guided ďǇ the iŶteƌǀieǁees͛ ƌespoŶses. Pƌoŵpts 
from the researcher were given only if necessary. Prior to the interviews a list of 
potential influencers was developed by the research team. The list was drafted based 
on previous interview findings, as well as literature review suggestions. This list was 
only introduced to farmers for cross-checking after farmers had listed stakeholders 
unprompted. In some cases it helped to remind farmers of stakeholders they had 
forgotten about but on reflection felt were important; in other cases farmers did not 
map some influencers although on our list; many stakeholders on the list had already 
been mapped unprompted.  Interviews were completed in November and December, 
2013. The interviews were conducted by the same researchers who conducted the 
early rounds of interviews. Most interviews lasted under one hour but some were 
loŶgeƌ. Most iŶteƌǀieǁs took plaĐe iŶ faƌŵeƌs͛ hoŵes. The 50 interviews were all audio 
recorded and transcribed. A photo of each influence map was taken for the four 
scenarios [four per interview x 50 interviews = 200 maps in total]. The influence maps 
thus provided two forms of data: the maps and scorings themselves and, crucially, the 
verbal explanations provided by farmers. Interview transcripts were imported into 
NVivo9 and coded for analysis. The influencers were coded and scores of each in 
relation to specific scenarios were recorded and analysed in SPSS. The maps were 
analysed per scenario across the sample to determine the influence of individuals, 
groups or other sources identified by farmers. 
 
 
 
4. Results 
In total, farmers placed 1515 influencers on the scenario-based influence maps across 
the four scenarios. Initially, these influencers represented 82 different influencers, 
ranging from family members, specific TV or radio programmes, local markets and 
agencies. Similar influencers were combined into the same categories to produce 26 
distinct influencers. The results for each scenario exercise are presented in Figures 3-
6. EaĐh figuƌe displaǇs the ŵodal ƌespoŶse foƌ eaĐh ͚iŶflueŶĐeƌ͛ sĐaled to the Ŷuŵďeƌ 
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of paƌtiĐipaŶts ŵeŶtioŶiŶg theŵ. ͚IŶflueŶĐeƌs͛ ǁith less thaŶ ϭϬ ŵeŶtioŶs iŶ eaĐh 
scenario are not included in the figures. 
 
Scenario 1: National badger cull 
Scenario 1 suggested that the Government would grant additional licences to allow 
for further badger culls in the areas participants were farming in. On the whole, 
farmers viewed this scenario positively. However, concerns were raised about 
personal safety and potential sabotage that farmers could become victim of if they 
were involved in a cull. Moreover, many farmers voiced significant concerns about the 
impact a cull would have on the public perception of farming and farmers: 
 
͞I͛ŵ foƌ it apaƌt fƌoŵ the ƌelatioŶships ǁith the puďliĐ. That͛s daŵagiŶg aŶd a 
major concern that farmers will be viewed badly by the public. In terms of 
trying to control TB iŶ Đattle, it͛s a good thiŶg͟ ;GTϭϬϴϰͿ. 
 
However, these concerns were only partly reflected during the mapping exercises (see 
Figure 3). OŶlǇ ϭϰ faƌŵeƌs plaĐed ͚loĐal ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ͛ oŶ theiƌ iŶflueŶĐe ŵaps, ǁith a 
ŵodal sĐoƌe of ϲ. “iŵilaƌlǇ, oŶlǇ ϰ faƌŵeƌs ŵeŶtioŶed the ͚loĐal pƌess͛, aŶd ͚ŶatioŶal 
ŵedia͛ ǁas ƌaŶked loǁest ;ŵode = 8) by 13 farmers. By contrast, farmers ranked 
people on the farm (n = 26, mode = 2, mean 2.15), farming organisations (n = 38, mode 
= 2, mean = 3.53) and their private vet highest (n = 36, mode = 2, mean = 3.56). 
Amongst farming organisations, it was the National Farmers Union (NFU) that stood 
out as the main source of information and were seen as an organisation from whom 
farmers could ͚fiŶd out all the details aŶd ǁhat ǁas goiŶg oŶ͛ ;GTϭϬϮϯͿ. “lightlǇ ŵoƌe 
popular than farming organisations, were other local farmers (n = 40). Neighbouring 
farmers and farming friends were also noted as influential by some interviewees and 
it was noted that peer pressure was likely to be a significant factor in relation to this 
scenario. Government institutions (such as AHVLA or Defra) (n = 36, mode = 6) or 
government vets were not seen as particularly influential (n = 24, mode = 6), partly 
due to the cultural difference between themselves and farmers: 
 
͞TheǇ͛ƌe those stupid people, the AHVLA. What oŶ eaƌth aƌe theǇ ƌeallǇ? That͛s 
ǁho͛s iŶ Đhaƌge of TB. TheǇ͛ƌe peŶ-pushers, as long as they fill the form in they 
doŶ͛t ƌeallǇ ďotheƌ.͟;CϱϳϰͿ 
 
--- Insert Figure 3 about here --- 
 
Overall, for this scenario, farmers could be described as sticking to the people that 
they know best and who were closest both physically and culturally. Despite the public 
controversy of badger culling, few farmers felt the need to seek out the views of the 
public. Other public interest groups such as supermarkets (in the food chain category) 
were also not seen as important or particularly influential. The set of influencers 
identified seems to reflect other research that suggests farmers think of bovine TB as 
a pƌoďleŵ that ĐaŶ ďe solǀed ďest ďǇ ͚ĐouŶtƌǇ people͛ ǁith ƌeleǀaŶt faƌŵiŶg expertise 
(Maye et al, 2014). 
 
Scenario 2: Oral badger vaccine 
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Scenario 2 suggested that an oral badger vaccine was available, and the Government 
would allow farmers and other land-owners to use it on their farmland. Farmers 
expressed mixed views on this scenario. On the one hand, some farmers, particularly 
in the Congleton area, thought that the use of bait rather than injecting vaccine made 
it a more practical and publicly acceptable method of badger control. Farmers in 
Devon were less enthusiastic, arguing that it was badger numbers that was a 
significant part of the problem and they would need controlling too. Here, farmers 
invoked various lay epidemiologies of badger control described in Maye et al. (2014) 
drawing on ideas of clean and dirty badgers, and population limits. For example: 
 
͞If Ǉou kŶoǁ Ǉou͛ǀe got a ĐleaŶ sett, fiŶe, ǀaĐĐiŶate theŵ aŶd theŶ theǇ͛ƌe 
covered, but you need them tested first to kŶoǁ ǁhat ǁe͛ƌe dealiŶg ǁith 
ƌeallǇ. What͛s the poiŶt of ǀaĐĐiŶatiŶg a ďadgeƌ that͛s got TB aŶǇǁaǇ? If the 
cull has worked, and the badgers left are clean, fine, vaccinate them͟ 
(GT1100). 
 
For this scenario, farmers attributed similar levels of iŶflueŶĐe to those ͚iŶflueŶĐeƌs͛ 
in the first scenario (Figure 4). One key difference was the role of Government 
institutions (n = 36, mode = 3, mean = 4.12) which was seen to be more influential. 
This seems to reflect a difference in expertise: whereas farmers viewed themselves as 
experts in badger control, vaccination invoked questions of practicality, cost and 
administration. Whilst farmers felt that culling was something farmers could do, 
vaccination was more the preserve of government officials such that farmers felt that 
information would be made available to them through written communication from 
Defra. This included information about effectiveness, the practicalities associated with 
administering the vaccine and costs. 
 
--- Insert Figure 4 about here --- 
 
In this situation, farmers were generally reluctant to source information themselves 
and instead assumed that it would be given to them by relevant bodies: 
 
͞Defƌa aƌe the oŶes that juŵp oŶ top of you and take charge of everything 
when you͛ǀe got TB aƌeŶ͛t theǇ? I͛d eǆpeĐt theŵ to soƌt it out foƌ Ǉou ƌeallǇ.͟ 
(C531) 
 
Interestingly, government vets were not seen in the same way. Neither, too, were 
actors in the food chain (n = 18, mode = 8, mean = 5.21), which is surprising given 
broader concerns about the role of vaccines in controlling diseases like Foot and 
Mouth Disease, or the wider use of drugs (such as antibiotics) in food production. 
Whilst this may have simply reflected that vaccines have to be safe to be licenced, it 
also suggests a division in how farmers see approaches to bovine TB: Government only 
plays a role when solutions are not solely within the realm of other physically and 
culturally proximate advisors. 
 
Scenario 3: Cattle vaccine 
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Scenario 3 suggested that a new cattle vaccine had been licenced and was now 
available for use. Farmers responded positively to this scenario, arguing that it was 
probably the most effective – if not only – way of preventing the spread of bTB. Some 
farmers raised concerns over the potential cost of a vaccine. Interviewees spoke about 
costs/benefit associated with a TB vaccine and suggested that if a cattle vaccine cost 
less to administer than the current cost of bTB testing and losses incurred due to the 
disease then it would be worth vaccinating their cattle. On the other hand, if a cattle 
vaccine cost more than current bTB control costs they would be more reluctant to 
implement it. Others raised concerns about the potential for cattle vaccination to 
impact upon international trade. For example: 
 
͞[A keǇ] thiŶg is hoǁ it affeĐts eǆpoƌts aŶd ǁhat otheƌ ĐouŶtƌies aƌe doiŶg...I͛d 
need to know what the implications were on trade issues but certainly if 
ǀaĐĐiŶatioŶ is aǀailaďle aŶd it͛s a ǁaǇ foƌǁaƌd then we would go along with it͟ 
(S397). 
 
The potential for food scares were noted by a minority of farmers in the sample and 
there was also a feeling among some farmers that cattle vaccination would need to 
be compulsory to ensure that all farmers vaccinated their cattle: 
 
͞Yes, ďut Ǉou Đould haǀe a food pƌoďlem. If it got on the television and you 
ĐouldŶ͛t eat the ŵeat foƌ soŵe ƌeasoŶ theŶ it ǁould ďe a disasteƌ.͟ ;GTϭϬϮϯͿ 
 
Faƌŵeƌs͛ ĐoŶĐeƌŶs aďout the ǀaĐĐiŶe ŵeaŶt that the ŵost iŶflueŶtial adǀisoƌs ǁeƌe 
their private vet (n = 45, mode = 2, mean = 2.2) and Government institutions (n = 40, 
mode = 2, mean = 4.2).  Government vets were also rated higher in this scenario than 
for the previous scenarios, but other farmers were less important (Figure 5).  Concerns 
about food safety, however, meant that food chain organisations were also rated 
more highly than previous scenarios. For this scenario then, the technical nature of 
the task, and potential for food safety issues, created a different landscape of advice 
and influence. 
 
--- Insert Figure 5 about here --- 
 
Scenario 4: All options available to farmers 
 
Scenario 4 suggested that all options would be open to farmers and they could select 
any ones they wished but would have to pay for them. Such a scenario is similar to the 
neoliberal model of animal health in New Zealand and Australia in which government 
hands over the responsibility to farmers to create new structures and organisations. 
When presented with this scenario, farmers felt that it would be an ideal situation as 
farmers would be able to choose the most appropriate control measures to use for 
their own farm. Nonetheless, the vast majority of interviewees favoured cattle 
vaccination, with most farmers suggesting that the use of other controls would not be 
necessary. 
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There did not seem to be significant concern among farmers about taking on financial 
responsibility for their chosen control measure, although some noted that costs would 
influence which measures they would choose to implement. While the general 
consensus among interviewees was that cattle vaccination would be the favoured 
option, complemented by badger culling in some instances, concerns were raised 
about the potential for contiguous farms to implement different control measures. As 
suĐh, the aĐtioŶs of iŶteƌǀieǁees͛ faƌŵiŶg Ŷeighďouƌs appeaƌ to ďe ŵoƌe iŶflueŶtial iŶ 
this scenario than in the previous three scenarios. This viewpoint is summarised well 
by a Great Torrington farmer: 
 
͞The Ŷeighďouƌs ǁould ďe iŵpoƌtaŶt oŶ this oŶe. You͛d Ŷeed to fiŶd out ǁhiĐh 
way they were going to go – were they going to vaccinate their stock and do 
the tƌappiŶg, oƌ ǁhat? OŶ this soƌt of thiŶg Ǉou ƌeallǇ ǁouldŶ͛t ǁaŶt all people 
doiŶg diffeƌeŶt thiŶgs so Ǉou͛d haǀe to ask ǁhiĐh ǁaǇ theǇ ǁas goiŶg to go aŶd 
if they agree which way I was going to go͟ ;GTϭϬϮϯͿ. 
 
IŶdeed the ŵappiŶg eǆeƌĐise ƌeǀealed that ͚otheƌ faƌŵeƌs͛ ;N = ϰϯ, ŵode = ϯ, ŵeaŶ = 
3.6) were cited just as often and were slightly less influential as private vets (N = 43, 
mode = 2, mean = 2.5). This reiterates previous findings which noted the influence of 
specific groups of other (in this case neighbouring) farmers (Oreszczyn et al., 2010). At 
the same time, Government vets and institutions, and farming organisations remained 
important (see Figure 6).  
 
--- Insert Figure 6 about here --- 
 
In some respects this finding is not surprising: in an uncertain policy environment, 
farmers are likely to trust the people who have always delivered animal disease policy, 
particularly when it covers many different technical aspects of disease control. 
However, at the same time, the scenario allows farmers to approach the problem of 
disease control in new and novel ways: the combination of different control methods 
requires coordination and co-operative working, particularly as disease control 
measures would be the financial responsibility of farmers. In the main, however, 
farmers did not deviate from the organisations that they were already familiar with 
by suggesting new organisations or partnerships. Thus, the freedom to develop 
disease control in line with farmers own preferences, did not lead to farmers 
suggesting new organisational structures. 
 
5. Discussion: webs of influence and logics of biosecurity 
This paper has argued that the existing behavioural and social science biosecurity 
literature needs to develop a more systematic method to examine social norms and 
iŶflueŶĐes oŶ faƌŵeƌs͛ ďioseĐuƌitǇ pƌaĐtiĐes aŶd ďehaǀiouƌs. Below we discuss two 
ways the stakeholder mapping approach contributes to the biosecurity governance 
literature. Firstly, we discuss the extent to which these methods tell us something new 
about faƌŵeƌs͛ ͚webs of influence͛ (Oreszczyn et al. 2010; Reed and Curzon 2015) in 
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relation to biosecurity and how this informs future work on farmer biosecurity 
practices. Secondly, we provide examples of how scenario analyses may contribute to 
further theoretical development, as well as identifying stakeholders. Reflecting on the 
process of stakeholder mapping, we show, for example, how these exercises inform 
uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs of faƌŵeƌs͛ biosecurity behaviours and the ͚iŶstitutioŶal logiĐs͛ 
(Higgins et al. 2016) that guide faƌŵeƌs͛ ƌespoŶses to diffeƌeŶt disease ĐoŶtƌol optioŶs. 
Potentially this provides a more robust method to identify stakeholders (in terms of 
categorisation, differentiation, contextualisation, etc.), and crucially, to improve and 
develop understandings of farmers͛ disease management behaviour and their 
responses to biosecurity policy. 
i. Webs of influence 
At a general level the scenario mapping exercise has helped to confirm previous 
biosecurity research regarding influencers. In terms of key influencers, the private vet 
was regularly considered to be an important influence on farmer decisions (Fisher 
2013). Private vets were considered to be particularly knowledgeable about 
vaccination in general and therefore farmers valued their views on cattle vaccination 
for bTB (scenario 3). The importance of the private vet confirms findings reported 
elsewhere (Gunn et al. 2008, Heffernan et al. 2008). Similarly, farmers noted the 
importance of being able to speak about the bTB situation with local farmers who 
were frequently identified as the most influential. Whilst these similarities confirm 
other research, the scenario methodology helps to provide a robust and systematic 
method to ďegiŶ aĐĐouŶtiŶg foƌ suďjeĐtiǀe Ŷoƌŵs iŶ faƌŵeƌs͛ ďioseĐuƌitǇ deĐisioŶs. 
 
The use of multiple scenarios is also instructive and novel, revealing how context, and 
the principle of compatibility (Burton 2004a), has an important bearing on who 
influences faƌŵeƌs͛ ďioseĐuƌitǇ deĐisioŶs. Foƌ eǆaŵple, faƌŵeƌ iŶflueŶĐe ǁas Ŷot 
uŶiǀeƌsal, ďut ǀaƌied ďetǁeeŶ sĐeŶaƌios. Pƌessuƌe to ͚go aloŶg͛ ǁith ǁhat otheƌ 
farmers were doing was expressed in relation to scenarios 1 and 4, for instance, 
despite concerns about personal safety. For other scenarios relating to badger 
vaccination, this social pressure was absent, despite the need for all farmers to 
participate for vaccination to work. Oreszczyn et al. (2010) suggested that farmers 
learned directly from their interactions with faƌŵiŶg Ŷeighďouƌs aŶd faƌŵeƌs͛ 
discussion groups, working more as a means of identity support. To some extent this 
is evident here, with farmers explaining, for example, that they would speak to 
neighbouring farmers and farming friends about oral badger vaccination but they 
would not consider them to be influential: 
 
͞I ǁouldŶ͛t ďe iŶflueŶĐed ďǇ theŵ [otheƌ faƌŵeƌs]. I͛d ďe iŶteƌested to kŶoǁ 
ďeĐause I aŵ just a ŶoseǇ peƌsoŶ. I ǁouldŶ͛t saǇ theǇ͛ƌe doing it so I [have] got 
to do it͟ ;“ϯϲϳ). 
 
The scenario exercises have therefore helped to confirm key findings from previous 
social science biosecurity research but they have also highlighted some important 
differences. In particular, in some – but not all – scenarios, Government organisations 
were identified as highly influential. Other studies suggest that biosecurity advice from 
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government agencies is not trusted or influential (e.g. Heffernan et al. 2008). The 
multiple scenarios in our research revealed that these sources of advice were much 
less iŵpoƌtaŶt ǁheŶ theiƌ adǀiĐe ǁas likelǇ to ďe at odds ǁith faƌŵeƌs͛ estaďlished 
expertise. For scenarios based on badger culling, for instance, farmers explained that 
they already have adequate information and knowledge about culling and have 
already formed strong opinions about it, identifying sources who they know well 
(private vet, farmer organisations, other farmers). In contrast, in the fourth scenario 
farmers would seek advice and information from a wider range of sources, including 
other farmers, farmer organisations and vets but also Government organisations. 
Given the range of options available to farmers this is perhaps not surprising. What is 
more surprising when comparing scenario scores is the retreat back to the state as 
situations become more complex and uncertain, with government vets and 
government institutions more important in scenarios 2, 3 and 4. IŶ this seŶse, faƌŵeƌs͛ 
responses were at odds ǁith the GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s ǀieǁ of ďioseĐuƌitǇ, ǁhiĐh suggests 
that farmers should bear the costs and responsibilities for animal disease (Maye et al. 
2014). We see then the value of scenario-based influence mapping as a means to 
enable decision-makers to more effectively understand likely farmer responses to 
specific biosecurity interventions. The eǆteŶt to ǁhiĐh faƌŵeƌs͛ logiĐs of ďioseĐuƌitǇ 
diverged from those of government are explored in more depth in the next section. 
 
ii. Logics of biosecurity 
Another advantage of the scenario-based influence mapping method was that the 
identification of influencers was an active and iterative process in which participants 
explained and justified their choices and selections. Farmers were encouraged to talk 
about and explain the rationale behind their mapping preferences. The discursive 
comments farmers provided to explain the logic behind specific influence maps is 
therefore valuable to researchers and policymakers to understand how farmers think 
about biosecurity governance issues. Recent work on institutional logics, which seeks 
to uŶdeƌstaŶd ͞hoǁ the oƌdeƌiŶg of ďioseĐuƌitǇ thƌough the deǀolutioŶ of 
responsibility is challenged by competing goals and imperatives͟ ;HiggiŶs et al. 2016, 
p. 1136), suggests that multiple logics need to be accounted for in biosecurity 
governance contexts. In analysing the responses and rationales farmers provided 
relating to biosecurity influencers, three broad ďioseĐuƌitǇ ͚logiĐs͛ ;i.e. patteƌŶs of 
rules/beliefs that guide organisational processes) could be detected. The three logics, 
described below, show the value of the method in not just identifying ͚ŵultiple logiĐs͛ 
in specific biosecurity governance contexts but in also connecting them to specific 
referent groups, which is essential for the targeted development of disease 
management and communication strategies (Reed and Curzon 2015). 
 
The first logic is localism. This is where farmers identify with local referent groups. The 
connections are both physical and cultural in terms of relational distance (Enticott 
2014). The private vet is particularly important as a source of local knowledge, as are 
neighbouring farmers. For farmers in scenario 1, for example, although badger culling 
is highly controversial and politically debated, it was not complex in terms of finding 
out new information about organisational processes (i.e. how it would work in 
practice or whom and what it would involve). Farmers identified referent groups who 
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ǁeƌe ͚Đlose to theŵ͛ ;pƌiǀate ǀet, otheƌ faƌŵeƌs, faƌŵeƌ oƌgaŶisatioŶsͿ aŶd ǁho theǇ 
regarded as reliable and trustworthy. Farmers frequently talked about the importance 
of local knowledge and familiarity with specific localised bTB situations on a particular 
farm was considered to be important. Farmers explained that private vets could 
provide tailored advice due to their knowledge of a particular farm or cattle herd. 
Farmers also noted the importance of having contact with the local NFU branch rather 
than just accessing information from the NFU at national level. Many farmers knew 
their local NFU representatives well and often referred to them by name during the 
interviews. On-the-ground experience was also considered to be important: the 
experiences of farmers whose badgers had been culled or vaccinated were more 
important than government scientific advice. 
 
The second logic is paternalism. This is similar to what Higgins et al. (2016) call an 
͚agƌaƌiaŶ logiĐ͛ aŶd is ǁheƌe faƌŵeƌs ideŶtifǇ goǀeƌŶŵeŶt iŶstitutioŶs aŶd the 
government as the ones who are responsible for – and should deal with – certain 
agricultural biosecurity and animal health issues, particularly in relation to 
vaccination. As noted earlier, as the scenarios became more complex government 
institutions and government vets became more important. In the oral badger vaccine 
scenario, for example, farmers argued badger vaccination issues weƌe the state͛s 
responsibility. State vets were therefore identified as important in scenario 3, which 
was technically demanding in terms of food safety regulations. Reliance on state vets 
for these scenarios contradicts the preference for local vets. There was an engrained 
sense of distrust in government among some interviewees, linked to perceived 
political inaction on the bTB issue. Indeed, the competence and commitment of the 
government was often raised by interviewees. The logic of paternalism helps to 
explain this apparent conflict. Whilst farmers might not have trusted the government, 
it ǁas theiƌ ƌole to ͚soƌt out the ŵess͛ that theǇ had Đƌeated. ‘atheƌ thaŶ Đƌeate a 
space in which the governance of animal disease could be made anew, the logic of 
paternalism allows farmers express negative views of the Government whilst 
simultaneously seeking the security of traditional institutions to resolve problems 
seemingly beyond their control (cf. Harries 2008). 
 
This tension is also reflected in a third logic, which we term business as usual. This 
logic re-imagines an old-style policy community between government and the NFU to 
work together to manage and maintain the countryside (Marsden et al. 1993). This 
logic combines aspects of both localism – the need to ground policy in local experience 
and country expertise – and paternalism – the need for traditional institutions to 
maintain control of problems and resolve them. Business as usual was most 
recognisable in relation to scenario 4. It does not suggest a radical new form of 
governance or come close to the cost-sharing model currently envisaged by 
Government. 
 
These findings have research and practice implications at two levels. First, from a 
policy perspective, government attempts to develop new models of biosecurity 
governance appear to be at odds with how farmers believe disease should be 
ŵaŶaged. The logiĐs of ͚pateƌŶalisŵ͛ aŶd ͚ďusiŶess as usual͛ highlight the diffiĐult task 
faced by UK governments to generate new approaches to animal disease policy where 
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farmers contribute to the costs and responsibility of policy. This is despite the logic of 
localism which venerates local expertise and local traditions. Together, these logics, 
ǁhilst seeŵiŶglǇ iŶ soŵe teŶsioŶ, highlight faƌŵeƌs͛ ďeliefs iŶ the iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of 
tradition and continuity in the governance of biosecurity. This raises a wider policy 
challenge in terms of harmonising relations between bTB biosecurity governance and 
faƌŵeƌs͛ institutional logics. Second, the identification of these logics has 
methodological implications for future biosecurity studies. On the one hand, scenario 
analysis appears to provide an effective method of identifying relevant stakeholders 
in biosecurity disputes for different policy contexts sensitive to the principle of 
compatibility. This fills an important methodological gap, particularly as biosecurity 
researchers have been encouraged to adopt more participatory approaches (Catley et 
al. 2012). On the other hand, the logics of localism, paternalism and business as usual 
identify particular aspects of producer identity. For survey research on biosecurity, 
scenario analysis can therefore assist in the identification of key dimensions of self-
identity around which questions can be framed. Fielding et al. (2008) have already 
shown that such dimensions of self-ideŶtitǇ to ďe iŵpoƌtaŶt iŶ eǆplaiŶiŶg faƌŵeƌs͛ 
behaviour. For instance, specific questions could be devised to examine the localism 
sense of identity in relation to bTB policy control. Scenario analysis and influence 
mapping could therefore help further refine aspects of self-identity in biosecurity 
research. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has argued for the need to develop better methods to identify stakeholders 
to iŵpƌoǀe uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs of faƌŵeƌs͛ ďioseĐuƌitǇ aŶd thus ďetteƌ iŶfoƌŵ stƌategies 
of disease prevention communication. Past studies that apply TORA/TPB frameworks 
are problematic in the sense that they do not account for appropriate influencers in 
specific contexts (Burton 2004a) and because they fail to account for the role of self-
identity (Fielding et al. 2008) in determining farmer behaviour. We have argued that 
scenarios and influence mapping methods can help to overcome this problem. 
Identifying biosecurity influencers should avoid categorising stakeholders into general 
groups or talking about biosecurity in general because behaviours and decisions vary 
both between diseases and contexts. Using bTB as a test case we have shown how the 
use of different scenarios can help to assess whether influences differ between 
situations (principle of compatibility). In the analysis of bTB we have identified 
relevant stakeholders but have also argued that influence varies in specific contexts. 
For example, government institutions are important in less familiar situations such as 
cattle vaccination. The paper has identified three logics – ͚loĐalisŵ͛, ͚pateƌŶalisŵ͛ aŶd 
͚ďusiŶess as usual͛ – that faƌŵeƌs͛ dƌaǁ upoŶ ǁheŶ talkiŶg aďout iŶflueŶĐeƌs iŶ 
relation to specific animal health governance scenarios. It is important to recognise 
these logics because they not only guide actions but also influence farmer responses 
to change (Higgins et al. 2016). Recognising multiple logics and their interplay is 
important in terms of communication with farmers, which needs to be sensitive to 
faƌŵeƌs͛ kŶoǁledge aŶd soĐio-cultural beliefs if uptake of changes by farmers is to be 
successful. 
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Scenario-based influence mapping, which combines scoring influences with an 
interactive dialogue with farmers/actors to understand processes, therefore reveals a 
wider understanding of the self-concept. We see from the data presented how farmer 
understandings are linked to cultural beliefs about nature, disease and how the 
countryside should be governed. This reveals a much broader understanding of the 
self-ĐoŶĐept ďeǇoŶd ŶotioŶs of ͚good faƌŵiŶg͛ so faƌ iŶĐluded iŶ ƋuaŶtitatiǀe studies 
of influence (Fielding et al. 2008). Through the discussion of logics we see too how 
cultural identities and beliefs about who should be responsible for certain 
action/technologies determines who farmers identify as influential. The methods 
presented address weaknesses in existing behavioural and social science biosecurity 
research and have the potential to significantly contribute to better understandings 
of farmer behaviour and influences in the future thereby improving disease 
prevention communication and related areas of agriculture and land use policy. 
 
Acknowledgements 
The research on which this paper draws was funded by Defra (Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs), as part of a larger project examining farmer 
confidence in methods to control bTB in wildlife (grant award numbers: SE3121 and 
SE3135). We acknowledge with thanks the constructive comments of the reviewers. 
Thanks also to James Kirwan for his help with the farmer interviews. The usual 
disclaimers apply. 
 
References 
 
AitkeŶ, D. ;ϭϵϴϱͿ ͚͚CouŶtƌǇŵiŶdedŶess͛͛ – The spread of an idea. Australian Cultural 
History. 4, 34-41. 
 
Ajzen, I. (1991) The theory of planned behaviour. Organisational Behaviour and 
Human Decision Processes. 20, 179-211. 
 
Ajzen, I. (2002) Perceived Behavioural Control, Self-Efficacy, Locus of Control, and the 
Theory of Planned Behaviour. Journal of Applied Social Psychology. 32(4), 665-683. 
 
AlaƌĐoŶ, P., WielaŶd, B., Mateus, A. L. P. aŶd DeǁďeƌƌǇ, C. ;ϮϬϭϰͿ Pig faƌŵeƌs͛ 
perceptions, attitudes, influences and management of information in the decision-
making process for disease control. Preventive Veterinary Medicine. 116(3), 223-242. 
 
AVMA. (2008) One Health: a New Professional Imperative. American Veterinary 
Medical Association, NW Washington, DC. 
 
Barker, K. (2010) Biosecure citizenship: politicising symbiotic associations and the 
construction of biological threat. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers. 
35, 350-363. 
 21 
 
Beedell, J. and Rehman, T. (2000) Using social-psychology models to understand 
faƌŵeƌs͛ ĐoŶseƌǀatioŶ ďehaǀiouƌ. Journal of Rural Studies. 16(1), 117-127. 
 
Benjamin, L. A., Fosgate, G. T., Ward, M. P., Roussel, A. J., Feagin, R. A. and Schwartz, 
A. L. (2010) Attitudes towards biosecurity practices relevant to Johne's disease control 
on beef cattle farms. Preventive Veterinary Medicine. 94(3–4), 222-230. 
 
Berkhout, F. and Hertin, J. (2002) Foresight futures scenarios: developing and applying 
a participative strategic planning tool. Greener Management International. 37, 37. 
 
Bingham, N., Enticott, G., and Hinchliffe, S. (2008) Biosecurity: Spaces, practices, and 
boundaries. Environment and Planning A. 40, 1528-33. 
 
Burgess, J., Clark, J. and Harrison, C. M. (2000) Knowledges in action: an actor network 
analysis of a wetland agri-environment scheme. Ecological Economics. 35(1), 119-132. 
 
BuƌtoŶ, ‘. J. F. ;ϮϬϬϰaͿ ‘eĐoŶĐeptualisiŶg the ͚ďehaǀiouƌal appƌoaĐh͛ iŶ agƌiĐultural 
studies: a socio-psychological perspective. Journal of Rural Studies. 20(3), 359-371. 
 
Burton, R. J. F. (2004b) Seeing Through the `Good Farmers' Eyes: Towards Developing 
an Understanding of the Social Symbolic Value of `Productivist' Behaviour. Sociologia 
Ruralis. 44, 195-215. 
 
Caƌƌ, “. aŶd Tait, J. ;ϭϵϵϬͿ Faƌŵeƌs͛ attitudes to ĐoŶseƌǀatioŶ. Built Environment. 16, 
218-231. 
 
Catley, A., Alders, R.G., Wood, J.L.N., (2012). Participatory epidemiology: Approaches, 
methods, experiences. The Veterinary Journal. 191, 151-160. 
 
Defra (2014a). The Strategy for Achieving Officially Bovine Tuberculosis Free Status for 
England. Defra, London. 
 
Defra (2014b). Defra bovine TB citizen dialogue. Cross-cutting summary. Defra, 
London. 
 
Dobson, A., Barker, K. and Taylor, S. (eds.) (2013) Biosecurity: The Socio-Politics of 
Invasive Species and Infectious Disease. Routledge, Abingdon. 
 
Egoz, S., Bowring, J. and Perkins, H. C. (2001) Tastes in tension: form, function, and 
ŵeaŶiŶg iŶ Neǁ )ealaŶd͛s faƌŵed laŶdsĐapes. Landscape and Urban Planning. 57(3–
4), 177-196. 
 
Ellis-Iversen, J., Cook, A. J. C., Watson, E., Nielen, M., Larkin, L., Wooldridge, M. and 
Hogeveen, H. (2010) Perceptions, circumstances and motivators that influence 
implementation of zoonotic control programs on cattle farms. Preventive Veterinary 
Medicine. 93(4), 276-285. 
 22 
 
Enticott, G. (2008) The ecological paradox: Social and natural consequences of the 
geographies of animal health promotion. Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers. 33(4), 433-446. 
 
Enticott, G. (2014) Relational distance, neoliberalism and the regulation of animal 
health. Geoforum. 52, 42-50. 
 
Enticott, G., Donaldson, A., Lowe, P., Power, M., Proctor, A. and Wilkinson, K. (2011) 
The changing role of veterinary expertise in the food chain. Philosophical Transactions 
of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. 366(1573), 1955-1965. 
 
Enticott, G., Maye, D., Fisher, R., Ilbery, B. and Kirwan, J. (2014) Badger vaccination: 
dimensions of trust and confidence in the governance of animal disease. Environment 
and Planning A. 46(12), 2881-2897. 
 
Fielding, K. S., Terry, D. J., Masser, B. M. and Hogg, M. A. (2008) Integrating social 
identity theory and the theory of planned behaviour to explain decisions to engage in 
sustainable agricultural practices. British Journal of Social Psychology. 47(1), 23-48. 
 
Fish, R., Austin, Z., Christley, R., Haygarth, P.M., Heathwaite, L.A., Latham, S., Medd, 
W., Mort, M., Oliver, D.M., Pickup, R., Wastling, J. M. and Wynne, B. (2011) 
Uncertainties in the governance of animal disease: an interdisciplinary framework for 
analysis. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B - Biological Sciences. 366, 
2023-2034. 
 
Fishbein, M. and Ajzen, I. (2010) Predicting and changing behavior: The reasoned 
action approach. Psychology Press, New York. 
 
Fisheƌ, ‘. ;ϮϬϭϯͿ ͚A geŶtleŵaŶ͛s agƌeeŵeŶt͛: the ƌole of soĐial Đapital aŶd tƌust iŶ 
transforming information into usuable knowledge. Journal of Rural Studies. 31, 13-22. 
 
Fleming, A. and Vanclay, F. (2010) Farmer responses to climate change and sustainable 
agriculture. A review. Agron. Sustain. Dev. 30(1), 11-19. 
 
Garforth, C. (2015) Livestock Keepers' Reasons for Doing and Not Doing Things Which 
Governments, Vets and Scientists Would Like Them to Do. Zoonoses and Public Health. 
62, 29-38. 
 
Garforth, C., McKemey, K., Rehman, T., Tranter, R., Cooke, R., Park, J., Dorward, P. and 
Yates, C. (2006) Farmers' attitudes towards techniques for improving oestrus 
detection in dairy herds in South West England. Livestock Science. 103(1–2), 158-168. 
 
Gaƌfoƌth, C. J., BaileǇ, A. P. aŶd TƌaŶteƌ, ‘. B. ;ϮϬϭϯͿ Faƌŵeƌs͛ attitudes to disease risk 
management in England: A comparative analysis of sheep and pig farmers. Preventive 
Veterinary Medicine. 110(3–4), 456-466. 
 
 23 
Gilŵouƌ, J., BeiliŶ, ‘. aŶd “Ǉsak, T. ;ϮϬϭϭͿ BioseĐuƌitǇ ƌisk aŶd peƌi‐uƌďaŶ laŶdholdeƌs 
– using a stakeholder consultative approach to build a risk communication strategy. 
Journal of Risk Research. 14(3), 281-295. 
 
Godfray, H. C. J., Beddington, J. R., Crute, I. R., Haddad, L., Lawrence, D., Muir, J. F., 
Pretty, J., Robinson, S., Thomas, S. M. and Toulmin, C. (2010) Food Security: The 
Challenge of Feeding 9 Billion People. Science. 327(5967), 812-818. 
 
Gunn, G. J., Heffernan, C., Hall, M., McLeod, A. and Hovi, M. (2008) Measuring and 
comparing constraints to improved biosecurity amongst GB farmers, veterinarian and 
the auxiliary industries. Preventive Veterinary Medicine. 84(3-4), 310-323. 
 
Harries, T. (2008). "Feeling secure or being secure? Why it can seem better not to 
protect yourself against a natural hazard." Health, Risk & Society 10(5), 479-490. 
 
Heffernan, C., Nielsen, L., Thomson, K. and Gunn, G. (2008) An exploration of the 
drivers to bio-security collective action among a sample of UK cattle and sheep 
farmers. Preventive Veterinary Medicine. 87(3-4), 358-372. 
 
Hernández-Jover, M., Gilmour, J., Schembri, N., Sysak, T., Holyoake, P. K., Beilin, R. and 
Toribio, J. A. L. M. L. (2012) Use of stakeholder analysis to inform risk communication 
and extension strategies for improved biosecurity amongst small-scale pig producers. 
Preventive Veterinary Medicine. 104(3–4), 258-270. 
 
Higgins, V. (2007) Performing Users: The Case of a Computer-Based Dairy Decision-
Support System. Science, Technology, & Human Values. 32(3), 263-286. 
 
Higgins, V., Bryant, M., Hernández-Jover, M., McShane, C. and Rast, L. (2016) 
Harmonising devolved responsibility for biosecurity governance: The challenge of 
competing institutional logics. Environment and Planning A. 48(6), 1133-1151. 
 
Hinchliffe, S. and Ward, K.J. (2014) Geographies of folded life: How immunity reframes 
biosecurity. Geoforum. 53, 136-144. 
 
Hinchliffe, S., Bingham, N., Allen, J. and Carter, S. (2016) Pathological Lives Disease, 
Space and Biopolitics. Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester. 
 
Hughes, R. and Huby, M. (2002) The application of vignettes in social and nursing 
research. Journal of Advanced Nursing. 37(4), 382-386. 
 
Hulme, M. and Dessai, S. (2008) Negatiating future climates for public policy: a critical 
assessment of the development of climate scenarios for the UK. Environmental 
Science and Policy. 11 (1), 54-70. 
 
Hyland, J. J., Jones, D. L., Parkhill, K. A., Barnes, A. P. aŶd Williaŵs, A. P. ;ϮϬϭϲͿ Faƌŵeƌs͛ 
perceptions of climate change: identifying types. Agriculture and Human Values. 
33(2), 323-339. 
 24 
 
Ingram, J. (2008) Are farmers in England equipped to meet the knowledge challenge 
of sustainable soil management? An analysis of farmer and advisor views. Journal of 
Environmental Management. 86(1), 214-228. 
 
Marsden, T., Murdoch, J., Lowe, P., Munton, R. and Flynn, R. (1993) Constructing the 
Countryside: An approach to rural development. Routledge, Abingdon. 
 
Maye, D., Dibden, J., Higgins, V. and Potter, C. (2012) Governing biosecurity in a 
neoliberal world: comparative perspectives from Australia and the United Kingdom. 
Environment and Planning A. 44, 150-68. 
 
Maye, D. and Kirwan, J. (2013) Food security: A fractured consensus. Journal of Rural 
Studies. 29 (0), 1-6. 
 
Maye, D., Enticott, G., Naylor, R., Ilbery, B. and Kirwan, J. (2014) Animal disease and 
narratives of nature: Farmers' reactions to the neoliberal governance of bovine 
Tuberculosis. Journal of Rural Studies. 36, 401-410. 
 
Miller-Perrin, C. L., Wurtele, S. K. and Kondrick, P. A. (1990) Sexually Abused and Non-
aďused ChildƌeŶ͛s CoŶĐeptioŶs of PeƌsoŶal BodǇ “afetǇ. Child Abuse and Neglect. 14, 
99-112. 
 
Mills, P., Dehnen-Schmutz, K., Ilbery, B., Jeger, M., Jones, G., Little, R., MacLeod, A., 
Parker, S., Pautasso, M., Pietravalle, S. and Maye, D. (2011) Integrating natural and 
social science perspectives on plant disease risk, management and policy formulation. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. 366(1573), 2035-
2044. 
 
Morris, C. and Potter, C. (1995) Recruiting the new conservationists: Farmers' 
adoption of agri-environmental schemes in the U.K. Journal of Rural Studies. 11(1), 51-
63. 
 
Naylor, R., Hamilton-Webb, A., Little, R. and Maye, D. (2017Ϳ The ͚Good Faƌŵeƌ͛: 
Farmer Identities and the Control of Exotic Livestock Disease in England. Sociologia 
Ruralis, in press, DOI: 10.1111/soru.12127 
 
Oreszczyn, S. and Carr, S. (2008) Improving the link between policy research and 
practice: using a scenario workshop as a qualitative research tool in the case of 
genetically modified crops. Qualitative Research. 8(4), 473-497. 
 
Oreszczyn, S. and Lane, A. (2000) The meaning of hedgerows in the English landscape: 
Different stakeholder perspectives and the implications for future hedge 
management. Journal of Environmental Management. 60(1), 101-118. 
 
 25 
Oreszczyn, S., Lane, A. and Carr, S. (2010) The role of networks of practice and webs 
of influencers on farmers' engagement with and learning about agricultural 
innovations. Journal of Rural Studies. 26(4), 404-417. 
 
Pannell, D. J., Marshall, G. R., Barr, N., Curtis, A., Vanclay, F. and Wilkinson, R. (2006) 
Understanding and promoting adoption of conservation practices by rural 
landholders. Australian Journal of Experimental Agriculture. 46(11), 1407-1424. 
 
Quine, C. P., Barnett, J., Dobson, A. D. M., Marcu, A., Marzano, M., Moseley, D., 
O'Brien, L., Randolph, S. E., Taylor, J. L. and Uzzell, D. (2011) Frameworks for risk 
communication and disease management: the case of Lyme disease and countryside 
users. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society. 366 (1573), 2010-2022. 
 
Reed, M. and Curzon, R. (2015) Stakeholder mapping for the governance of 
biosecurity: a literature review. Journal of Integrative Environmental Sciences. 12, 15-
38. 
 
Soleri, D. and Cleveland, D. A. (2005) Scenarios as a tool for eliciting and understanding 
farmers' biological knowledge. Field Methods. 17(3), 283-301. 
 
Stryker, S. (1994) Identity theory: its development, research base, and prospects. In: 
Denzin, N. K. (ed.) Studies in Symbolic Interactionism. Vol. 16. JAI Press, 9-20. 
 
Terry, D. J. and Hogg, M. A. (1996) Group norms and the attitude behaviour 
relationship: a role for group identification. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 
22(8), 776-793. 
 
Terry, D. J., Hogg, M. A. and White, K. M. (1999) The theory of planned behaviour: Self-
identity, social identity and group norms. British Journal of Social Psychology. 38, 225-
244. 
 
Toma, L., Stott, A. W., Heffernan, C., Ringrose, S. and Gunn, G. J. (2013) Determinants 
of biosecurity behaviour of British cattle and sheep farmers—A behavioural 
economics analysis. Preventive Veterinary Medicine. 108(4), 321-333. 
 
van der Heijden, K. (1996) Scenarios: The art of strategic conversation. John Wiley & 
Sons, Chichester. 
 
Wynne-Jones, S. (2013) Ecosystem Service Delivery in Wales: Evaluating Farmers' 
Engagement and Willingness to Participate. Journal of Environmental Policy & 
Planning. 15(4), 493-511. 
 
  
 26 
Table 1: bTB scenarios  Scenario 1: Rolling out a national ďadgeƌ Đull iŶ high ƌisk aƌeas. It͛s Apƌil ϮϬϭϰ 
and the results of the pilot badger culls that took place in Gloucestershire and 
Somerset in 2013 have been officially reported. The Government has decided to 
roll out the scheme to other high risk areas in England. Natural England has 
therefore reported that they will be granting 10 additional licences for 2014, 
one of which could cover an area in which your farm is located.  Scenario 2: Oral badger vaccine. We are now in 2019 and an oral badger vaccine 
has been licensed and is available for use across England. Farmers are able to 
obtain the vaccine in a bait form to use on their own farms. Use of the oral 
badger vaccine is not compulsory but the Government is making farmers – as 
well as other landowners and wildlife groups – aware of its availability and 
potential use as a way to combat bTB.  Scenario 3: Cattle vaccination. We now fast forward to 2023 and an 
announcement comes from Defra (or its equivalent at that time) that a cattle 
vaccination for bTB has been licensed by the EU and the Veterinary Medicines 
Directorate and is now available for use in England.  Scenario 4: A range of measures are available. We are in 2025 and there are a 
wide range of measures available to farmers to tackle bTB on their farms. There 
is a cattle vaccine available, as well as an oral badger vaccine. You are also 
allowed to employ a trained marksman to cull badgers (through cage trapping 
and / or free shooting) on your farm. Farmers are expected to pay for the 
measures they select to control TB. 
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Table 2: Interview sample by farm type 
 Stroud Congleton Great Torrington Total 
Beef farmers 11 10 9 30 
Dairy farmers 6 5 7 18 
Farmers with 
beef and dairy 
cattle 
0 1 1 2 
Total number of 
interviewees 
17 16 17 50 
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Figure 1: Influence map 
 
  
 29 
Figure 2: Example of completed influence map ;authoƌs͛ suƌǀeǇͿ 
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Figure 3: Influence map, scenario 1 (badger cull) 
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Figure 4: Influence map, scenario 2 (oral badger vaccine) 
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Figure 5: Influence map, scenario 3 (cattle vaccine) 
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Figure 6: Influence map, scenario 4 (all options) 
 
